



המכון לאסטרטגיה ציונית
THE INSTITUTE FOR ZIONIST STRATEGIES

Addendum to the Document:
Demographic Trends in the Land of Israel
(1800-2007)

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המכון לאסטרטגיה ציונית THE INSTITUTE FOR ZIONIST STRATEGIES

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המכון לאסטרטגיה ציונית הוא גוף עצמאי הפועל למען שמירת צביונה היהודי והדמוקרטי של מדינת ישראל על פי עקרונות מגילת העצמאות.

המכון פועל לשמירת זכויות האדם במדינת ישראל ברוח עקרונות החירות, הצדק, היושר והשלום של מורשת ישראל.

המכון פועל למען הידוק הקשר בין יהודי התפוצות למדינת ישראל על פי ערכי הציונות.

המכון עוסק בעריכת מחקרים, כתיבת תוכניות והגשתן, הדרכת מנהיגים צעירים, ייזום כינוסים, סמינרים, סיורים ופעילויות אחרות למען חיזוקה של מדינת ישראל כביתו הלאומי של העם היהודי.

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1. Demographic Processes in the Land of Israel

a. The Population of the State of Israel - Yearly Increase

According to the data of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) the Jewish population grew to 5,660,000 people in 2009¹, and exceeded the high version of the ICBS forecast, which projected 5,654,800 Jews residing in Israel in the year 2010.

Together with the repatriates from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) who were not classified by religion at the Ministry of the Interior, the Jewish population comprises 5,979,000 people. It is greater than the 5,953,000 projected by the medium version^a and only 0.6% less than the high version of the ICBS forecast for 2010 — 6,015,700 people.

Even if the annual growth of the Jewish population remains steady in 2010, with an identical rate as in 2009, i.e. 1.6%, it may reach 5,754,000 people, 100,000 more than the high version and 142,600 people above the medium version of the ICBS forecast for 2010.

Along with the repatriates, whose nationality is not determined, the Jewish population may reach 6,075,000 people or 60,000 people more than projected by the high forecast and 122,400 people above the medium version of the ICBS forecast for 2010.

The number of Israeli Arabs at the end of 2009 amounted to 1,526,000 people. Even if their annual growth, which is continuously decreasing from year to year, remains in 2010 as it was in 2008, i.e. - 2.6%, there will be about 1,565,000 Arabs in Israel at the end of 2010, 36,000 people fewer than projected by the high version (1,601,000 people) and 8,500 fewer than the low version of the ICBS forecast for 2010 (1,573,500 people).

These data suggest that the Jewish population is growing faster than expected by the high version of the ICBS projection made in 2006. On the other hand, the Arab population grew much more slowly than anticipated even by the low variant of the ICBS projection.

The natural increase of Jews, after two decades of maintaining its stable level, continues to grow for the tenth consecutive year. In addition to this phenomenon the immigration to Israel – the Aliyah – began to rise again, and it is accompanied by an increasing number of Israelis returning to Israel after years of residence abroad. At the same time, over the past ten years the pace of reduction of natural growth of the entire Arab population of Israel has accelerated, while the emigration of Arabs from the Palestinian Authority sharply increased.

^a According to forecasters, the medium variant of population projection is considered most likely to be realized.

A continuation of this demographic trend may lead to an increase of the Jewish majority in the total population of the Land of Israel by 2030, and possibly even earlier.

Let us consider and analyze recent demographic data published by Israeli, Palestinian and other sources in more detail.

b. *Immigration to the Land of Israel*

The economic and political crises in various countries influenced the situation of their Jewish populations, and led to massive waves of immigration to Israel.

Israel's success in defending the country and developing its economy contributed to this immigration process. Conversely, the country's failures increased emigration from the country, and lowered the total number of Jewish immigrants to Israel.

However, even when taking periods of crisis into account, the Jewish migration balance remained positive on the whole since the establishment of the State, with the exception of only a few years.

The Positive Jewish Migration Balance remains strong even in recent years, despite the decline in immigration from the FSU and Ethiopia and as a result of the increasing immigration from Western Europe, the U.S., and South America².

During the first eleven months of 2009, Jewish immigration from Asia increased by 15%, from Europe by 19%, with immigration from the UK growing by 41% and from the European countries of the FSU by 23%. Jewish immigration from the Americas grew by 18%, with immigration from the United States growing by 21%, from Brazil by 19% and from Argentina by 63%.

The most significant decline that affected the total balance of the Jewish immigration to Israel at this time was due to the decline in immigration from Ethiopia by 84%. If we disregarded the data on immigration from Ethiopia, we would find that immigration over eleven months of 2009 from the rest of the world grew by 18%, and amounted to 12,547 people.

Altogether about 14,500 olim, 6% more than in 2008, came to Israel in 2009 according to the ICBS³.

Along with the increase in Jewish immigration, there is an ongoing and increasingly popular phenomenon of return to Israel by Israelis who emigrated from the country in the past years⁴.


According to the Ministry of Absorption, during 2009, about 10,200 Israelis who stayed abroad for many years had returned to Israel, compared with 3,132 returnees in 2008⁵. This is the largest number of returning citizens since the founding of the State. Most of all returnees in 2009 came from the United States – 5,427. Additionally, 645

returned from the UK, 490 from Canada, 323 from France, 252 from Russia and 174 from Ukraine⁶.

c. The Demographic Transition in the State of Israel

The Jews, followed by the Christians, have completed most of the stages of the "demographic transition"^b and have already entered the stage of demographic stabilization. In recent years, there has even been a certain increase in the natural growth of the country's Jews, which is considered to be the highest among the developed countries.⁷

In 1960 the Total Fertility Rate (TFR)^c of the Jews (3.49) was the lowest in the total population of the State of Israel. The TFR of the Muslims was then 9.31, of the Druze – 7.88 and of the Christians – 4.61.



The TFR of the Jews decreased from 3.64 in 1955, to 2.62 between 1990 and 1999. It then rose again and in 2004 the TFR of Jews (2.71) far exceeded not only the fertility of the Christians (2.13), but also, for the first time, it exceeded the fertility of the Druze (2.66). During the next four years the TFR of the Jews rose by 14% to 2.88 in 2008, back to the level of 1983.

^b "Demographic transition" is characterized by an accelerated decrease in the population's birth rate.


^c The Total Fertility Rate is the average number of children a woman is expected to give birth to over the course of her life.

The TFR of Muslims, which at its peak in 1960 was 9.31, has decreased by 59% to 3.84 by 2008.⁸ Thus, it reinforces the assumption that the TFR of Muslims is continuing the collapse stage of the "demographic transition".

The difference between the TFR of Jews and Muslims diminished from 5.82 in 1960 to only 0.96 in 2008. In Jerusalem, the TFR of Muslims and Jews was already equal in 2006, and stands at 3.9.

The decline in the TFR of the Arab citizens of Israel, which began in the 60s of the last century, continues more strongly under the laws of "demographic transition". **The TFR of the Arabs in Israel over the last 10 years has dropped by about 19%, from 4.4 in 1998 to 3.57 in 2008 - a difference of only 0.69 children compared with the TFR of Jews in 2008.**

Analysis of the demographic development by calculating the values of the exponential trend indicates that if the existing tendency continues, **it may lead to the TFR equality of the two populations even faster - perhaps by the year 2017.**



Dr. Uzi Rebhun and Gilad Malach in their study "Demographic Trends in Israel", came to a similar conclusion, that: "The Jewish fertility rate will be similar to that of the Muslim fertility rate which is only one child higher now. We are facing a change in the trend that may lead to long-term stability in the balance between Jews and Arabs in Israel"^{10 9}.

By Dr. Uzi Rebhun and Gilad Malach's estimation, the TFR of Muslims (not including Israel's Southern District) may be reduced to 2.6 by 2030. In their opinion, the TFR of

the Bedouin in the Southern District may be reduced to 5 during the same period of time. The TFR of Jews according to their estimate will rise to 2.9 by 2030¹¹.

It is important to notice that during recent years the TFR development process among the Bedouin in the Southern District entered into the collapse stage of the "demographic transition" as it dropped from 10.6 in 1998 to 6.91 in 2008, a decrease of 35% within 10 years. The calculation of the yearly geometric mean ratio demonstrates a 3.69% annual decrease in the Bedouin TFR.

Just for comparison, the TFR of Muslim residents of Israel, also fell 35% within 20 years: from the peak of 9.31 in 1960 to 5.98 in 1980. Thus, the Bedouin fertility rate is now decreasing twice as fast than it decreased among all Muslims residents in Israel.

According to the ICBS, the Annual Increase rate of Bedouin in the Southern District declined from 6,33%¹² in 2000 to 4,43% in 2008¹³, i.e. by more than 32% within 8 years. A continuation of this trend could lead to equality between the Natural Increase of the Bedouin and Jews in 2030 and possibly earlier.

This development is logical, since it reflects the processes of modernization and rapid urbanization that is taking place among the Bedouin over the course of five decades, and has been bearing fruit in recent years.

The new generation of Bedouin is much more educated, and it can be seen especially in the revolutionary increase in the number of Bedouin women with higher education. (See "The Impact of Education on Fertility").

d. *Live Births of Jewish and Muslim Israeli Citizens – A Comparison*


The Total Fertility Rate of the population is a function of the number of Live births among the population of women. Comparing the live births of Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel reflects the changes that have been taking place within the two populations.

The ratio of Jewish live births in the overall population of Israeli citizens diminished from 83.5% in 1955 to 69.6% in 1995, and remained at this level until 2001. From this year onwards, the ratio of Jewish live births rose to 72.3% and when taking in consideration the repatriates, whose nationality is not determined, it became 75.1% of the overall population in 2009^{d 14}. It thus reverted to the level it was 20 years earlier, in 1989.

^d Accounted for the time period of one year, from September 2008 until October 2009.

During a time period of nine years, the number of Jewish Live births has increased by 24%, from 91,936 children in 2000 to 114,727 in 2009 (119,219 Live births including the returnees, whose nationality is not defined).

On the other hand, the share of Arab citizens in the Total Live births in Israel rose, and even doubled, from 16.5% in 1955 to 30.4% in 1995. From this year onwards, it was stable until 2001 and then began to decrease once again. It dropped by approximately 18% over just eight years to 24.9% in 2009 – i.e., to the level registered 31 years earlier, in 1978.



During the same period, the number of Live births among Muslims in Israel has dropped by 4%, from 36,317 in 2001 to 34,909 infants in 2009. All Arab Live births in Israel dropped during this period even more - by 5%, from 41,360 births in 2000 to 39,431 births in 2009.

This process follows the laws of demographic transition. It is expected that following an increase in the mortality rate due to an aging of the population, this development will lead to the continuation of a sharp decline in the natural increase of Israeli Arabs.

e. The Influence of Education on Fertility

*"The more years of schooling a woman has, the fewer children she is likely to have... In all recent studies, additional secondary education for women correlates with lower fertility"*¹⁵.

In 1961, the median years of education among Israeli Arabs was a mere 1.2. Their TFR during the same year was at its highest – 9.31 children per woman.

As Dr. Khaled Abu 'Asbeh and Amira Karakra reported: "The rise in the educational level of women among the Arab population is very noticeable: in 1961, 69% of Arab women never attended schools, in comparison to 30% among the men. In 2002, only 10% of the women (3% of the men) had never attended any school... Data from the Ben-Gurion University's Center for Bedouin Studies and Development reveal that there was only one female student in 1988, only six female students in 1995, but their number has swelled to some 250 today"¹⁶.

According to the report of the "Alnohud", the Association for the Education of Bedouin women in the Negev, Ben-Gurion University had only one Bedouin woman graduate in 1995, but in the span of 1998-2007, there was a total of 150 female Bedouin graduates of the university.. By 2007, the number of Negev Bedouin women who have received higher education exceeded 700¹⁷.

Within the span of just two generations, the education level of Arab women in Israel has increased 10 times - up to 12 years of schooling, and only 8.5% of women (2.5% of men) had never attended school in 2008¹⁸.

More than 55% of Arab women had at least 11 years of schooling (83% among Jewish women), and about 21% - completed their secondary education (48% among Jewish women).

The median years of education of Arab women in the 18-44 age group was 12 years of schooling, when 70% of them had received at least 11 years (96% among Jewish women) and 30% had completed upper secondary education (57% among Jewish women) .

Whereas in 1961, the discrepancy between the TFR of Arab and Jewish women in Israel stood at 5.8 children per woman, by 2008 it decreased to only 0.69 children, 88% less than in 1961.

The consistent rise in the education level of Arab women in Israel indicates that it is approaching the education level of Jewish women (median 12.8); it also indicates a continuous decrease in the total fertility rate of Arab women, towards equalization with the fertility rate of Jewish women (2.88).

2. Demographic Trends among the Arabs in Judea, Samaria and Gaza

a. Fertility versus Education

The report published by leading Palestinian sociologist Dr. Salim Tamari, states the following:

- "Fertility rates increased directly after the 1967 war and then declined in all four areas. The fertility rate started to decline in East Jerusalem and among Palestinians living in Israel in the beginning of the 1970s and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1970s.

- The change in fertility rates between 1967 and 1987 is related to socioeconomic conditions, such as the mother's level of education, her work outside the house and the family's place of residence. Changes in fertility rates were not related to the ideological position that encourages high fertility rates...".¹⁹.

According to the document prepared in 2007 for the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) by Birzeit University: "Palestinian fertility rates started to decline toward the end of the 20th century.... Education is another significant determinant of fertility in Palestine. For example, the mean number of children born to currently married women has decreased from 7.89 among the illiterate to 6.16 among those with elementary education, to 4.17 among those with secondary education, and to 3.84 among those with tertiary education".²⁰

In 1970, 65.1% of Arab women and 27.8% of men, or 47.5% of all residents of Judea and Samaria, never attended school. In 2007, only 7% of residents of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and 1% of the 15 to 24 age group, were illiterate^{21 22}..

The number of Arab women in Judea and Samaria who have an education level of nine or more years, including higher education, grew from 9.3% in 1970 to 42.2% in 1995^{24 23}. In the Gaza Strip, the percentage of women with a similar level of education reached 45.5% as early as 1990. The total adult literacy rate in the PA reached 93.8% in 2009²⁵.

As Professor Janet Abu-Lughod already noted in December 1986: "The Palestinians are now the "best educated" community in the Arab World, and education, as previously mentioned, is one of the strongest inhibitors to high fertility"²⁶.

In research I conducted in 1987, I found that the demographic processes underwent by the Muslim citizens of Israel replicate themselves among Arabs in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip²⁷.

The data published by the Palestinian Health Ministry²⁸, indicates that such a tendency did indeed materialize as expected and at a much higher rate than it had happened among Israeli Muslims.

b. The Development of the Natural Growth in Judea, Samaria and Gaza

In accordance with the highest forecast, prepared by the demographers of the Norwegian Institute FAFO²⁹, the natural increase of population in Judea and Samaria, was expected to drop from 2.7% in 2002 to 2.6% in 2005, to 2.3% in 2010 and 2.1% in 2015. The natural growth of population in the Gaza Strip also had had been expected to decrease from 3,5% in 2002 to 3.3% in 2005, to 2.9% in 2010 and to 2,6% in 2015 .

According to the low forecast of the UN³⁰, the average annual natural growth in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip for 2005–2010 was supposed to be 3.02%. Between 2010 and 2015, it was supposed to be 2.62%; by 2050, it was supposed to drop to a rate of 0.95%.

The recent UN estimate for the Population Natural Increase in Judea, Samaria and Gaza in 2007 was reduced to 2.9%, equal to the level projected by FAFO for the year 2010³¹.

The data of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) is usually overestimated compared with the data of the Palestinian Health Ministry. However, the PCBS was also forced to acknowledge the continuing downward trend in fertility of the residents of the Palestinian Authority (PA).

The natural increase of the Arabs in Judea and Samaria dropped by 54% from its peak of 4.21% in 1991³², reaching 2.1% in 2005³³, which anticipated the FAFO forecast by ten years. In the Gaza Strip, there was a 45% drop in the natural growth rate – from a peak of 5.12% in 1991 to 3.10% in 2005. In 2004, the natural growth rate of the Arabs in Gaza was even lower, and stood at a mere 2.8%.

All in all, it took only 14 years for the natural increase of the Arabs in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip to drop by 45% from the peak of 4.58% in 1991 to 2.5% in 2005, the level of natural growth that actually anticipated the UN forecast by six years.

From the data published by the PCBS on the eve of 2010³⁴, it follows that the TFR of the PA residents dropped by more than 23% over the ten year span of 1997 to 2007. This process is 21% faster than it had happened among the Arabs, residents of Israel, during the same period of time.

But in addition to the process of implementation of the "demographic transition" laws, there is another factor that has an important influence on the demographic development among the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza – the emigration abroad.

c. The Emigration Factor

According to ICBS data, the Arab migration balance in Judea, Samaria and Gaza was negative for fourteen years, from 1967 to 1993, and in total reached 258,900 people, an average of 9,958 persons annually³⁵. The number of emigrants during this period was equal to 14% of the total Arab population living in Judea, Samaria and Gaza in late 1993.

The Arab migration balance also remained negative after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. Professor Justin McCarthy cites the results of a population census in the PA in 1997 published by the head of the Palestinian Statistics Bureau (PSB), Hassan Abu Libdeh. From these data, the number of emigrants amounted to 325,253 people³⁶.

According to the Civil Administration of Judea and Samaria 321,239 people, an average of 22,946 people annually emigrated from 1994 to 2007³⁷. Between 2005 and 2007 the emigration of Arabs from Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip increased on a massive scale. In general, according to the Civil Administration of Judea and Samaria during these three years 152,807 people, on average 50,936 per year, emigrated from the Palestinian Authority.

In 2007, 59,861 people emigrated from Judea and Samaria alone. However, due to the blockade imposed against the Gaza Strip following the capture of power there by Hamas, the emigration, which in 2005 reached 24,915 people, had fallen to just 507 people in 2006 and to 1,547 people in 2007.

For 40 years, from 1967 to 2007, the negative migration balance of Judea, Samaria and Gaza amounted to 580,139 persons, an average of 14,503 people annually.

As Professor Janet Abu-Lughod noted in 1986: "Nor will the Arab population within Palestine be able to grow indefinitely. Some outmigration, even in the absence of forced expulsion, is inevitable"³⁸.

Canadian journalist Mark MacKinnon reported on November 20, 2006: "Even worse for the cause of future Palestinian statehood, a recent study by Bir Zeit University found that 32 per cent of Palestinians, and 44 per cent of young Palestinians, would emigrate if they could. Because of restrictions on movement, however, few can reach the foreign embassies in Tel Aviv"³⁹.

The same survey results were received by the An-Najah University in May 2007⁴⁰. An opinion poll conducted by "Near East Consulting" in the Gaza Strip, pointed to an even higher percentage - 47% of Gazans want to emigrate abroad⁴¹.

If we translate these survey results into numbers, we will find that more than one million Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza want to emigrate abroad.

In an interview given on July 2, 2007, to the London daily *Asharq Alawsat*, Salam Fiad, Prime Minister of the Emergency Palestinian Government, commented: "How will we be able to deal with the problem of 40 to 50,000 Palestinians that have emigrated and many more that are not emigrating just because they do not have the means? We are losing in this respect..."⁴².

We can assume that as the result of the emigration of young people, the yearly increase of Arab population will continue decline rapidly. Respectively, the share of Arabs in the total population of Land of Israel will fall sharply over a short period of time.

If the bureaucratic obstacles on the way of Arab young people willing to emigrate were to be removed, it, in turn, would further influence the changing demographic balance in the Land of Israel in favor of Jews.

3.